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Perspectives on the Selection
of Federal Judges
Spite Nominations to the United
States Supreme Court: Herbert C.
Hoover, Owen J. Roberts, and the
Politics of Presidential Vengeance in
Retrospect
By PETER G. FISH*
VARIETIES OF RETRIBUTION
Presidential revenge as a motivating force behind Supreme
Court nominations is an ineluctable thread running through
American judicial selection politics. Such nominations emerge
out of varied contexts, but are characterized by common ele-
ments of: (1) a judicial and/or senatorial attack on the presi-
dent's political ideology or programs, including appointments,
or both, (2) injury suffered by the president, and (3) executive
branch retaliation aimed at the United States Supreme Court,
the Senate, or both.
Retaliation may take the form of a spite nomination. In its
least controversial form, such an appointment may reflect gen-
eralized presidential disagreement with the constitutional juris-
prudence crafted by the existing Court. An excellent example is
Richard Nixon's choice of Warren Burger to succeed judicial
"activist" Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States.
To fill the latter's place, Nixon named one who, even if he failed
to roll back the Warren Court's record in civil rights, criminal
* Professor of Political Science and Law, Duke University; A.B., Princeton
University, 1960; M.A., Pol. Sci., Johns Hopkins, 1965; Ph.D., Pol. Sci., Johns Hopkins
University, 1968. The author is indebted to Kathleen A. Wasch, Dule Law '90, for
copyediting assistance, and to Sandra L. Perkins for manuscript preparation.
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procedure, and reapportionment, would perceive "himself as a
'caretaker' of the Constitution and not as a 'super-legislator'
with a free hand to impose . social and political view-points
upon the American people."'
Andrew Jackson's appointment of Roger B. Taney to suc-
ceed Chief Justice John Marshall reflected the President's acute
dissatisfaction with the Senate, rather than with the Court on
which he had already placed three loyalists. 2 Another vacancy
enabled Jackson to reward his former Attorney General and
Treasury Secretary with a nomination to the Supreme Court.
Intense Senate opposition to the Jackson ally and inveterate
opponent of the Bank of the United States led, however, to
Senate "pigeonholing" of the nomination. An incensed Jackson
then successfully named Taney to the chief justiceship over the
bitter-end opposition of a then-reigning congressional trio com-
posed of John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Henry Clay.3
A third variety of executive branch political retribution may
be aimed at both the Court and the Senate, Franklin D. Roos-
evelt's choice of Hugo Black as his first Supreme Court nominee
constituted a presidential response not only to the disheartening
judicial record compiled by the Court under Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes, but also to the Senate's previous treatment of
the President. The appointment of the young Alabama senator
was seen by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes as a Roos-
evelt-orchestrated "blow ... to the prestige of Chief Justice
Hughes [and] a distinct slap in his face, and in those of Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Roberts, and Sutherland, who have con-
stituted the old guard majority." ' 4 At the same time, Black's
selection constituted a blow to the Senate that had torpedoed
the President's Court-packing bill, an issue on which the nomi-
nee had stood loyally with the White House.5
H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLnTCAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 14 (2d ed. 1985).
' C. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
oF THE UNITED STATES 46-49 (John McLean), 49-52, (Henry Baldwin), 53-55 (James M.
Wayne) (1974).
Id. at 15-38.
2 H. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THm INSIDE STRUGGLE,
1936-1939, 66 (1954).
5 G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND Tm JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 45-47 (1977); J.
PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEw DEAL: THE GROWTH OF THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITON IN CONGRESS, 1933-1936, 157-58 (1967).
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Another class of spite nomination exists, and it is with this
class that modern presidents have enjoyed relatively little success.
As in the Taney and Black prototypical nominations, the Senate
looms so large as a target of presidential wrath that the Court
is subordinated as an issue. To be sure, the inter-branch contest
occurs against the background of a present or prospective rising
or ebbing constitutional tide. But the most marked characteristic
of this inter-branch contest is the time-bound nature of the
struggle. Such spite nominations occur in the wake of a sena-
torial defeat administered to the president's original choice for
the Court, thereby provoking the White House to make public
or private expressions of resentment and to nominate a successor
whose obvious or intrinsic political-judicial profile seemingly
differs little from that offered by the vanquished predecessor.
The profile may also represent a qualitative dimunition. What-
ever its relative merits, to constitute a meaningful spite strategy,
the second choice nomination must pose a political challenge to
a Senate with a composition unchanged from that which dealt
a defeat to the president's most favored candidate. In this man-
ner, the president hopes to retrieve lost political capital, disci-
pline the Senate, and compel the Upper Chamber to capitulate
and accept the nominee whose presence on the Supreme Court
is perceived by both White House and Senate as making a
material impact on constitutional jurisprudence.
PRESIDENTIAL CHOICES
By refusing to confirm a president's first-choice nominee for
the United States Supreme Court, the Senate starkly demon-
strates its constitutionally prescribed prerogative of advising on
and consenting to executive nominations. 6 Three times in the
twentieth century the Senate has wielded its power to reject a
president's most favored Supreme Court nominee: Robert H.
Bork in 1987," Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. in 1969,8 and John
J. Parker in 1930. 9 In each instance, the president submitted a
6 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cI. 2.
1 See 133 CoNG. REc. 167, S15011 (daily ed. 1987) (Judge Bork's nomination
was rejected on October 23, 1987).
' See 115 CoNG. REc. 26, 35396 (1969) (Judge Haynsworth's nomination was
rejected on November 21, 1969).
9 See 72 CoNG. IEc. 8, 8487 (1930) (Judge Parker's nomination was rejected on
May 7, 1930).
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second choice, a choice which came in the wake of an arduous,
prolonged and bitter confirmation fight. That struggle made the
president's first choice a highly politicized, if not demonized,
symbol, and required that the White House mobilize extensive
political resources in a losing cause.
The president retains the initiative notwithstanding the Sen-
ate's treatment accorded his first nominee. Yet the appointment
options may be more limited than they appear on their face.
The president must somehow prevent further losses and recoup
lost political capital in selecting a successor nominee to stand in
the shoes of the fallen first choice. In the emotion of the mo-
ment, the beaten president must choose. The chief executive may
extend an olive branch to the triumphant senatorial majority by
nominating a successor nominee acceptable to its members, and
thereby appear to "sell out" to political enemies. The president
may remain adamant and take vengeance on those who had
defeated the original choice, by picking a second choice anath-
ema to the senators who had voted against the first choice.
Finally, the president may seek out a nominee whose spite nom-
ination credentials are masked by a public image and/or repu-
tation that makes the nominee acceptable to the president's
opponents in the Senate. Whether an obvious clone of the van-
quished first choice or a masquerader is selected as the substitute
nominee, the president has confronted the Senate with a spite
nomination, likely with the intention of putting political enemies
in the Senate to the test.
Three modern American presidents have confronted the sec-
ond choice nominee dilemma: Ronald Reagan, Richard Nixon,
and Herbert Hoover. Only Hoover, however, produced a win-
ning successor Supreme Court nominee. Why did Hoover suc-
ceed where Nixon and Reagan failed? In considering the second
choice nomination of Owen J. Roberts and the background of
the analogous nominations of Douglas H. Ginsburg and George
Harrold Carswell, it may be possible to suggest the manner in
which presidents have resolved tensions between fidelity to po-
litical ideology and resort to political pragmatism in responding
to senatorial defeats of their first choices for a Supreme Court
position. Furthermore, it may answer the question of whether
the nomination of Roberts constituted abject capitulation to his
worst enemies or the only successful spite nomination of the
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century by a president whose political leadership qualities have
long been denigrated.10
FIRST CHOICE DEFEATS
Nonconfirmation of President Ronald Reagan's Supreme
Court nominee Robert Heron Bork in the autumn of 198711
evoked memories of earlier defeats administered by the Senate
to similar first choices advanced by Presidents Richard Nixon
and Herbert Hoover. The nominations of Clement F. Hayn-
sworth, Jr. and John J. Parker ignited political storms in their
times.' 2 All three were, when nominated, sitting judges on United
States Courts of Appeals who tendered impressive professional
credentials.13 Yet, their initial selections involved political, re-
gional, and ideological calculations. Hoover and Nixon both
named candidates compatible with a "southern strategy" of
promoting Republican party development in the South and with
ideological attributes, primarily business progressivism, temper-
ance, and mild judicial activism in Parker's case and judicial
self-restraint in the case of Haynsworth. 14 Regionalism figured
not at all in Bork's selection, but the nominee's notable repu-
tation for holding long articulated "conservative" positions on
o See J. BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN
THE WHITE HOUSE 58-66 (3d ed. 1985).
" See supra note 7.
12 See 115 CoNG. REc. 18, 24198 (1969) (the Senate received the nomination on
August 21, 1969); 72 CONG. REC. 6, 5849 (1930) (Judge Parker was nominated on March
21, 1930); PUB. PAPERs: RICHARD NIXON 1969, 1071 (1971) (Judge Haynsworth was
nominated on August 18, 1969).
," Parker's pre-judicial and judicial careers are summarized by Fish, John Johnston
Parker, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, SUPPLEMENT SIX: 1956-1960, 493-96 (J.
Garraty, ed. 1980). See Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: Hearings on Nomination of
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 591-602 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Charles
Alan Wright, Charles T. McCormick, Professors of Law at the University of Texas); S.
PREP. No. 100-7, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 215 (1987) (Bork's qualifications presented).
'4 Fish, Torchbearer for Pre-New Deal Southern Economic Development: Judge
John J. Parker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CoNSTrrtIONAIisM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 253-95 (K. Hall and J.
Ely, Jr., eds. 1989). On Parker as a "dry," see memorandum on "John J. Parker" by
Mabel Walker Willebrandt (copy), accompanying Willebrandt to Parker, April 22, 1929,
John J. Parker Papers, box 18, Southern Historical Manuscripts Collection, University
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, N.C. On Haynsworth, see Hearings, supra
note 13, at 602-11 (Statement by G.W. Foster, Jr.).
1988-89]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
privacy, civil rights, and the first amendment made him a polit-
ically attractive first choice.15
Whatever the intrinsic professional merits of Judges Bork,
Haynsworth, and Parker, their at least putative political and
ideological attributes generated ultimately fatal opposition. Chal-
lenges to the nominees came from groups that represented inter-
ests antithetical to those of the president and that depended in
varying degrees on public policies as enunciated by the Supreme
Court. Bork and Haynsworth were perceived as capable of tilting
a narrowly divided Court against the civil rights-civil liberties
record achieved by the Warren Court and preserved by its suc-
cessor-the Burger Court. 16 Parker's potential membership was
seen quite differently; his presence would not likely be a catalyst
for changing the anti-labor record developed by the Taft Court.'7
On the other hand, Parker might prove to be unsympathetic
toward preservation of the meager civil rights gains achieved by
black Americans in the Court under Chief Justices White and
Taft. 8 Thus, those interests that regarded themselves as threat-
ened by the prospective confirmation of these three Associate
Justices waged successful battles inside and outside of the Senate
forum.
REAGAN AND NIXON
Defeat of their first choices distressed the appointing presi-
dents. Each suffered political and psychological loss, and they
reacted: Reagan and Nixon publicly, Hoover privately. "I am
saddened and disappointed that the Senate has bowed to a
campaign of political pressure .. .," Reagan declared following
Is D. Rutkus, Senate Consideration of the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be
a Supreme Court Associate Justice: Background and an Overview of Issues, CRS Report
for Congress, 87-761 GOV, 35-66; N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 1-3.
11 On Bork's projected impact, see Rutkus, supra note 15, at 32-34; on Hayn-
sworth's projected impact, see Hearings, supra note 13, at 614-18 (statement of Victor
Rabinowitz, President, National Lawyers Guild); H. ABRAnAm, supra note 1, at 294-
307.
" See Confirmation of Hon. John J. Parker to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing on the Confirmation of Hon. John J.
Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 56 (1930) [hereinafter Parker Hearing] (statement of William Green,
President, American Federation of Labor).
'* See Parker Hearing, supra note 17, at 75-76 (statement of Walter White).
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the defeat of Judge Bork's confirmation. 19 Previously, Reagan
had denounced the Senate for allowing "[t]he confirmation proc-
ess [to become] an ugly spectacle, marred by distortions and
innuendoes, and casting aside the normal rules of decency and
honesty."' 2 In contrast, Nixon, in private, was even more en-
raged on receiving news that the Senate had rejected the Hayn-
sworth nomination. He reportedly "[i]nveighed against the liberal
press which had built the opposition to .Haynsworth, against
organized labor for its vendetta against the judge, and most of
all against those Republican senators who had betrayed their
President." ' 2' Nixon muted his public rage. He regretted the
Senate's action and especially its contribution to "[t]he brutally
vicious and ... unfair attack on [Judge Haynsworth's] integ-
rity .... "22
Both Reagan and Nixon did more than emit public wrath.
They publicly promised retaliation in the form of a successor
nominee no more, and perhaps less, satisfactory to the Senate
majority which had so recently vanquished their first choices.
Thus, in a moment of high emotion, they opted to "hold the
course," compelling senators whose energy had been spent in
successful opposition to swallow pride, scruples, and partisan
interests and accept the president's second choice.
With the nomination of Judge Bork facing rejection, Presi-
dent Reagan, in the context of an emotional partisan conclave,
made a promise to search for a successor "[t]hat they'll object
to just as much as they did for this one.' ' The reality of defeat
evoked a somewhat tempered promise to select someone who
shared "Judge Bork's belief in judicial restraint: that a judge is
bound by the Constitution to interpret laws, not make them," '
who did not "[c]onfuse the criminals with the victims, [and]
who does not invent new or fanciful constitutional rights for
,9 President's Statement on Senate Action on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork,
23 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1223 (Oct. 23, 1987).
" President's Address to the Nation on the Robert H. Bork Nomination, 23
WEEKLY Comp. Pirs. Doc. 1172 (Oct. 14, 1987).
21 R. EvANs, JR. & R. NovAx, NIXoN IN Tm WHrTE HOUSE: THE FRUSTRATION
OF PowER 163 (1971).
22 President's Statement on the Senate Vote on Judge Haynsworth's Nomination,
5 WEEKLY Comp. PRFS. Doc. 1638 (Nov. 21, 1969).
1 President's Remarks to the New Jersey Republican State Committee, 23 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 1169 (Oct. 13, 1987).
24 President's Statement on Senate Action on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork,
supra note 19, at 1223.
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those criminals.... -25 President Nixon similarly pledged that
when the Congress returns for its second session .. . I will
nominate another Associate Justice. The criteria I shall apply
for this selection, as was the case with my nomination of Judge
Haynsworth, will be consistent with my commitments to the
American people before my election as President a year ago.26
GINSBURG AND CARSwELL
True to their word, Reagan and Nixon named nominees who,
if confirmed by the Senate, would snatch a presidential victory
from the jaws of what appeared to be resounding defeat at the
hands of the Senate. Thus, Reagan and Nixon both pursued an
ill-disguised strategy of vengeance against the Upper Chamber-
a strategy intended to hold the constituency mobilized behind
the initial nominee and to force the Senate into a posture of
ironic acceptance of a second-choice nominee possessing profes-
sional credentials widely perceived as inferior to those of the
original nominee.
Reportedly at the behest of Attorney General Edwin Meese
III and conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina, President Reagan named another court of appeals
judge, Douglas Ginsburg.2 7 The forty-one-year-old Ginsburg,
sporting a "paper trail" vastly shorter than his prolific prede-
cessor's, was, the President assured Bork loyalists, "a believer
in judicial restraint [and in courts that] administer fair and firm
justice, while remembering not just the rights of criminals but,
equally important, the ... rights of society. ' 28 No similar ide-
ological assessments accompanied Nixon's nomination of George
Harrold Carswell.29 At a subsequent press conference, however,
21 President's Address to the Nation on the Robert H. Bork Nomination, supra
note 20, at 1173.
2 President's Statement on the Senate Vote on Judge Haynsworth's Nomination,
supra note 22, at 1638.
See Cohodas, Ginsburg Nomination May Be Test for Senate, 45 Cong. Q. 2670-
71 (1987). See generally President's Remarks Announcing Douglas H. Ginsburg's Nom-
ination, 23 WEEKLY Corm,. PREs. Doc. 1246 (Oct. 29, 1987) (the Ginsburg nomination
was not submitted to the Senate).
18 President's Remarks Announcing Douglas H. Ginsburg's Nomination, supra
note 27, at 1247.
21 See President's Announcement of Intention to Nominate Judge George Carswell,
6 WEEKLY Con,. PRns. Doc. 52-53 (Jan. 19, 1970).
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the President lauded the Judge's record "[o]f strict construc-
tionism as far as the interpretation of the Constitution and the
role of the Court, which I think the Court needs." 30 Word soon
spread that the naming of Carswell had all the trappings of a
spite nomination. Attorney General John Mitchell had reportedly
scrutinized the nominee's judicial record, afterwards exclaiming:
"He's almost too good to be true." ' 3' A prominent Republican
senator learned that the Justice Department had rated Carswell
well below Haynsworth and several other candidates.
That made it clear that the choice of Carswell was vengeance-
to make us sorry we hadn't accepted Haynsworth-and, at the
same time, it was an attempt to downgrade the Supreme Court
and implement the Southern strategy. The Attorney General
obviously believed that we had no stomach for another fight
after Haynsworth, and that we would accept any dog .... 32
The second choice nominations of Ginsburg and Carswell
turned to ashes, thereby thwarting a presidential strategy of
retaliation against the Senate. Ginsburg's chances of confirma-
tion disintegrated in the wake of news that he had previously
used marijuana and had misrepresented or concealed his record
as an official in the Reagan Justice Department. 33 Unlike Gins-
burg, who responded to the disclosures of his pre-judicial activ-
ities by requesting that Reagan withdraw his nomination, Carswell
and Nixon fought the Senate down to the final vote-in vain.
Carswell's racism, manifested prior to and during his service on
the federal bench, mobilized the same pressure groups that had
opposed Haynsworth's nomination. The nominee's deception of
the Senate Judiciary Committee and his mediocre professional
qualities, publicized by Senator Roman Hruska, Nixon's floor
manager of the nomination, further dimmed confirmation pros-
pects.3 4
10 President's News Conference, 6 WEaY Comp. PREs. Doc. 92-93 (Jan. 30,
1970).
R, HARms, -DEcisioN 1 (1971).
32 Id. at 11-12.
31 See Cohodas, Ginsburg Hurt Badly by Marijuana Admission, 45 Cong. Q. 2714
(1987) (The nomination was withdrawn at Ginsburg's request on November 7, 1987);
see also President's Statement on the Withdrawal of Douglas Ginsburg's Nomination,
23 WEEKLY Con,. PaRs. Doc. 1298 (Nov. 7, 1987).
14 See H. ABRAus, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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TmD CHOICE PRAGMATISM
Their spite nominations destroyed, both Reagan and Nixon
acted as political pragmatists. Both selected third choice candi-
dates encumbered with little pre-judicial political baggage and
endowed with extensive and highly professional records. Reagan
named another federal appellate judge, Anthony M. Kennedy of
the Ninth Circuit. 35 Reagan presented Kennedy as "a true con-
servative" and as a key contributor to "keeping our cities and
neighborhoods safe from crime. ' 36 Kennedy's candidacy had
been pressed, however, by White House chief-of-staff Howard
Baker, Jr. as a "moderate." 37 When asked: "Did you cave into
the liberals, Mr. President?" Reagan vehemently denied harbor-
ing such a motive. 38 Some observers wondered, however, if the
once calculating and then defiant Reagan had not succumbed to
pragmatic temporizing by "appointing someone who can be
confirmed, but not appointing someone who is going to turn the
Court around."' 39 Nixon obscured the suggestion that he had
abandoned his loyal Haynsworth-Carswell constituency with a
verbal blast at the Senate's reputed regional bias. The President
charged "lt]hat it is not possible to get confirmation ... of any
man who believes in the strict construction of the Constitution,
as I do, if he happens to come from the South."' 4 With that,
Nixon announced that his "[n]ext nominee must come from
outside the South .... -41 Minnesotan Harry A. Blackmun, then
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
3' See President's Remarks Announcing Anthony M. Kennedy's Nomination, 23
WEEKLY CoMP. PaRs. Doc. 1318 (Nov. 11, 1987); see also 113 CoNG. REc. 188, S16771
(daily ed. 1987) (the Senate received the nomination on November 30, 1987).
16 President's Remarks Announcing Anthony M. Kennedy's Nomination, supra
note 35, at 1319.
37 Cohodas, supra note 27; Cohodas, "Cautious Senate Wants to Like Judge
Kennedy," 45 CoNo. Q. 2786-88.
31 President's Remarks Announcing Anthony M. Kennedy's Nomination, supra
note 35, at 1319; see 134 CONG. REc. 7, 5516 (daily ed. 1988) (Justice Kennedy was
confirmed on February 3, 1988).
19 President's Remarks Announcing Anthony M. Kennedy's Nomination, supra
note 35, at 1319.
0 "President's Remarks Regarding Court Nominations, 6 WEEKLY COMsP. PRES.
Doc. 504 (Apr. 9, 1970).
4' Id.
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Circuit, became choice number three. 42 He possessed impeccable
professional and apparently satisfactory ideological credentials.
The nomination proved anticlimactic and noncontroversial; the
Senate confirmed the future author of the landmark abortion
opinion in Roe v. Wade by a vote of 94-0.43
HOOVER AND PARKER
Of the three twentieth century presidents whose first choice
Supreme Court nominees suffered defeat in the Senate, only
Herbert Hoover successfully achieved confirmation of his second
choice, Owen J. Roberts. That the confirmation came on a
unanimous voice vote suggests that Hoover, unlike Nixon and
Reagan in their second tries, abandoned an initial strategy of
political calculation and eschewed a spite nomination, instead
making a pragmatic and temporizing one.
"The White House is gloom-encircled," newsman Frederic
Wile reported in the wake of what he termed "the newest of a
pitilessly long list of 'breaks' which have gone against the Pres-
ident." 44 Supreme Court nominee John J. Parker had suffered
defeat on May 7, 1930.45 White House sources intimated that
Hoover was at least "resentful" of the treatment accorded his
42 See 116 CONG. REc. 9, 11861 (1970) (The Senate received the nomination on
April 15, 1970); PuB. PAPERS: RPcHARD NIXON 1970, 1177 (1971) (nominated on April
14, 1970).
"1 116 CONG. Rac. 11, 15142 (1970); see H. ABRAILAm, supra note 1, at 19. Not
classifiable as actual nominations were the six Supreme Court candidates publicly ad-
vanced in 1971 by President Richard M. Nixon. Upon the resignation of Hugo L. Black,
retired effective September 17, 1971, Justices of the Supreme Court, 404 U.S. iiin (1971),
and John Marshall Harlan, retired effective September 23, 1971, id. at ivn, and prior
to the customary inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1971, at 39, col. 1, the President submitted to the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary the names of six potential nominees: Mildred Lillie,
Herschel H. Friday, Sylvia Bacon, Robert C. Byrd, Charles Clark, and Paul H. Roney.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 8. While the Bar Committee had the six names
under consideration, the President named two nominees not on the list. Whether or not
he ever actually intended to nominate any one of the six candidates remained unclear.
Id., Oct. 22, 1971, at 1, col. 8; see H. ABRAAm, supra note 1, at 21. On October 21,
1971, William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. were nominated to fill the two
vacancies on the Court. PuB. PAPERS: RICHARD NIXON 1971, 1053-57 (1972) (Submitted
to the Senate on October 22, 1971); 7 WEEKLY Con,. PREs. Doc. 1441 (October 25,
1971); 117 CoNG. REc. 34, 44857 (1971) (Powell was confirmed on December 6, 1971);
117 CONG. REc. 35, 46197 (1971) (Rehnquist was confirmed on December 10, 1971).
- Wile, Washington Observations, Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), May 9, 1930,
at A8.
". See supra note 9.
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nominee by the Senate. 46 A story in the black press suggested a
more advanced state of distress. The Chicago Defender reported
him as declaiming that Parker's defeat "is an outrage. I do not
know what this country is coming to when it can be run by
demogogues and Negro politicians." 47
The Senate vote represented a presidential defeat of major
proportions. Hoover had "staked his own political prestige on
the outcome," waging an unrelenting campaign to win converts
to his cause, especially from among regular Republican senators
in a Senate nominally controlled by the President's party.48
Shortly after success had narrowly eluded him, Hoover huddled
for over an hour with Senator Henry Justin Allen of Kansas, a
key Hoover administration operative on the Senate floor, and
two of his "ablest attorneys," Secretary of State Henry Stimson
and Undersecretary of State Joseph Cotton, later joined by
Attorney General William Mitchell.49 They pondered the Presi-
dent's response to the outcome of the vote.
Whether or not to issue a public statement became the thresh-
old question. White House "insider" and syndicated newspaper
columnist Mark Sullivan had previously advised against such a
release. It would be interpreted as either "gloating over victory"
or, if Parker lost, as "resentment." 0 The nomination spoke for
itself. It demonstrated that Hoover "picks good men, backs up
appointees and fights to the last, [and] wants to do equity to
46 World (New York, N.Y.), May 8, 1930, at 1-2.
41 Chicago Defender, June 7, 1930, at 1, col. 4; see D. Lsio, HOOVER, BLAcKs,
AND Lry-Wm s: A STuDY OF SouTimRN STRATEmEs 232-33 (1985).
41 Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Mo.), May 8, 1930, at 2A; Sun (Baltimore, Md.),
May 8, 1930, at 2. The Republicans enjoyed an apparently safe voting margin in the
Senate (R:56, D:39, F-L:1) U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2 Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, 1083 (Bicentennial ed. 1975). Weak party cohesion
caused by the presence of western progressives split the senatorial majority party along
an east-west geographical axis. J. Hoadley, Congressional Voting Patterns in an Era of
Party Realignment: The U.S. Senate, 1927-1941, at 30 (1981) (unpublished manuscript).
In the Seventy-first Congress, this bloc enjoyed a hard core membership of fourteen,
and, when in coalition with Southern Democrats, it became what Senate majority leader
James E. Watson called the "real majority." C. Dollar, The Senate Progressive Move-
ment, 1921-1933: A Roll Call Analysis, 239 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department
of History, University of Kentucky, 1966); J. WATSON, As I KNrw Timm: MEMOIRS OF
JAMES E. WATSON 264 (1936).
4 Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), May 8, 1930, at Al; World (New York,
N.Y.), May 8, 1930, at 1, col. 8; Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 8, 1930, at 1, col. 8;
Herald Tribune (New York, N.Y.), May 8, 1930, at 10.
" Memorandum by Mark Sullivan [May, 1930], Presidential Personal File, Herbert
Hoover Papers, box 210, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
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the South." 5' Notwithstanding the resident journalist's misgiv-
ings, drafts of a press release made the White House rounds.
All of these drafts emitted presidential hostility toward those
who had brought defeat upon Hoover's nominee. The several
drafts also defended the nomination by portraying Parker's per-
sonal and professional qualifications as unassailable, by noting
endorsements from bench and bar, and by arguing the politically
neutral character of the appointment.52
Hoover, unlike Nixon and Reagan, assumed the garb of
Supreme Court defender in asserting that the Senate's injection
of politics trenched on the separation of governmental powers.
The paramount question, as Hoover declared in a draft state-
ment, was: "Shall the legislative branch control the decisions of
the Supreme Court? That issue is clearly drawn. '5 3 Describing
as "sinister" the hostility of senators to Supreme Court nomi-
nees based "solely upon the ground that the nominee had not
proven himself to be an adherent to certain political theories,"
the President berated those who "would impel [the Justice] by
judicial decisions to change the Constitution and laws in accor-
dance with their desires and theories. ' 5 4 The Constitution, not
the popular will, must prevail. The draft statement thus empha-
sized efforts long pursued by Court critics to utilize the ordinary
political process to promote constitutional change. It noted:
The attempt to control the decisions of the Supreme Court by
recall, or by a review of decisions, by the legislative branch of
the government had repeatedly failed. Baffled at the polls in
the attempt to subordinate the Supreme Court, this group of
Senators would now achieve their end by intimidation and
humiliation of nominees. They would therefore amend the
Constitution by confirming the appointment of those only who
believe that the Constitution should, by judicial decision, be
made to mean something else. The ultimate result of their
corrosive efforts would be a Court subordinated not merely to
the legislative branch, but to the prevailing political views of
1 Id.
12 See draft of statement by Herbert Hoover, May 7, 1930, Presidential Subject
File, Judiciary, Supreme Court Endorsements, "Parker, Judge John J.," Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, box 192; Final Draft, May 8, 1930, id., box
193.
" Draft of statement by Herbert Hoover, no date, Hoover Papers, supra note 52,
box 192.
54 Id.
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the Senate alone.55
The early emphasis on the Senate's collective performance
reportedly reflected Cabinet support for an all-out frontal attack
intended to "blow the Senate out of the water." '5 6 Such sweeping
criticism would necessarily include within its ambit Hoover loy-
alists Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.), Arthur Capper (R-Kan.),
Frederick Steiwer (R-Ore.), and others who voted against Parker
largely because of his reputed racism? The attack strategy faded
because of such concerns as well as because of the related fear
that after the lapse of little more than a year in office, an
emotional Hoover response would "start a feud and cripple the
rest of his administration." 58
Revisions of the press release de-emphasized Senate volition
and instead stressed the destructive role played by what the
President termed "new influences" which had "carried the ques-
tion of selection of a Justice into the field of political issues
rather than [into that of] personal and professional fitness."1 9
Paramount among the "new influences" on the landscape of
American political pluralism were black Americans. Senator Al-
len of Kansas entertained no doubts about the role played by
the race issue in Parker's defeat. It was "the thing that really
beat him," he declared, adding that "everybody down here
realizes that."' 60 An early White House draft statement assailed
blacks for promoting "wicked misrepresentations in connection
with the eminent rights of the colored people to participate in
citizenship."' a6 Parker's 1920 campaign remarks had been little
more than "an offhand statement," Mark Sullivan subsequently
"Id.
56 Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 9, 1930, at 1, col. 1.
' Sullivan, Parker's Defeat is Laid to Drive by 24 Senators, Herald Tribune (New
York, N.Y.), May 8, 1930, at 11; World (New York, N.Y.), May 8, 1930, at 1;
Contrasting Roll Calls (editorial), N.Y. Times, May 11, 1930, sec. III, at 4; Memorandum
by Arthur H. Vandenberg, "The Parker Vote," May 7, 1930, Scrapbook no. 2, Arthur
H. Vandenberg Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 9, 1930, at 1, col. 1.
" Final Draft, May 8, 1930, supra note 52.
60 Letter from Henry J. Allen to M.J. Barris, May 19, 1930, Henry Justin Allen
Papers, box C-58, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; see
also Sullivan, supra note 57.
61 Draft, supra note 52.
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rationalized.6 2 However disingenuous the NAACP's attack, an-
other draft muted the point; it stressed instead the error of using
Parker to symbolize black disfranchisement. Such personifica-
tion departed from reality "as evidenced by his decisions as a
judge upholding the negro rights and the support of leading
colored men of his own state. ' 6
Organized labor's early and intense opposition to Parker was
discounted in one draft as a "misunderstanding," founded on
what insider Sullivan considered "an utterly narrow triviality."64
Concentration on his opinion in the labor injunction case of
United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consolidated
Coal and Coke Co.65 associated Parker with the anti-labor ju-
risprudence of the Taft Court and/or with widely assailed labor
injunctions, notwithstanding Hoover's draft plea "that in the
case alleged against him he was judicially bound to follow the
Supreme Court decisions."' Transformation of Parker into an
anti-labor symbol via interest group politics had "confused the
main issue" as the President saw it.67 Worse still, the opposi-
tion's achievement served to place "many Senators in the posi-
tion of appearing to vote for or against some of these issues
with which Judge Parker had little to do." '68
That legislators had reacted to a demonized Parker attested
to the triumph of public opinion. All true democrats must en-
dorse "the vital importance of public opinion," Hoover stated,
but when mass opinion functioned as it had in the Parker vote,
it threatened to alter "fundamentally... the structural balance
of our institutions. ' 69 Public opinion could play such a role in
executive nominations largely because of a then recent change
in the Senate rules that opened Senate sessions when debates
Sullivan, Senate Politics Called Menace to High Court, Herald Tribune (New
York, N.Y.), January 24, 1932, sec. II, at 1, 2, col. 2.
11 Draft, May 7, 1930, supra note 52. Although Hoover used the plural form,
only one pre-1930 Parker opinion involved the constitutional status of black Americans,
City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930), aff'd, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
On support of North Carolina blacks for Parker, see Hearing, supra note 17, at 8 (C.M.
Eppes to Lee S. Overman, April 7, 1930); id. at 18 (S.G. Atkins to Overman, April 9,
1930); id. at 76 (J.E. Shepard to Overman, March 29, 1930).
" Draft, supra note 53; Memorandum by Sullivan, supra note 50.
61 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
Draft, May 7, 1930, supra note 52.
67 Id.
6sId.
6 Id.
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and votes were held on presidential appointments. 70 Under con-
ditions of openness, antagonists could effectively present their
case. Hoover later remarked that their case in the Parker fight
consisted of unprecedented "outright statements of untruth...
put abroad . .. by people antagonistic to any Republican ad-
ministration."' 7 But once in the arena of public opinion, the
nominee and his supporters found themselves at a peculiar dis-
advantage. "No man fit for the position of a Supreme Court
Justice can or will organize counter-propaganda against mistaken
impressions or strive for the weighting of public opinion in his
own favor," Hoover stated.72
HOOVER AND ROBERTS
However vindictive the President may have felt, he deter-
mined not to assail the Senate publicly, to denounce interest
group politics, or to berate public opinion. Instead, he concluded
that public silence combined with action afforded the best strat-
egy. Perhaps, as friendly journalist Frederic William Wile sug-
gested, Hoover thought that the American public would perceive
as self-evident the unfair Senate treatment accorded his nominee
"as just one bit more of its characteristic and incurable cantan-
kerousness. ' 73 More likely, as Hoover wrote an Iowa newspaper
editor, "the stronger answer would be to present a new man at
once." 74
Nomination rumors swept the Capital; "Hoover Expected
To Name Westerner to Supreme Court," Scripps-Howard's
Washington Daily News headlined. 75 From the East, Benjamin
N. Cardozo once more loomed as a possibility.76 However, forty-
eight hours after the Senate's vote on Parker, the second-choice
70 The important rule change made in 1929 is discussed in J. HARIs, THE ADVICE
AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 253-55 (1953).
7' Hoover Papers, supra note 50, box 166 (Letter from Herbert Hoover to Beverly
A. Johnson, July 18, 1930).
72 Final Draft, May 8, 1930, supra note 52.
73 Wile, supra note 44.
' Letter from Herbert Hoover to Verne Marshall, May 9, 1930, File on "Parker
Appointment by Hoover," Verne Marshall Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
West Branch, Iowa.
71 Daily News (Washington, D.C.), May 8, 1930, at 1 (mentioning both Curtis D.
Wilbur (9th Cir.) and Frank H. Rudkin (9th Cir.)).
76 Id.
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nomination went to Owen Josepheus Roberts.77 Roberts had
previously surfaced as a candidate for a high position in the
administration. With Justice Brandeis' confiding to Felix Frank-
furter the "uncommonly good impression on our Court" made
by advocate Roberts, and Frankfurter's assessment of him as
"one of the few lawyers at present carrying a national reputa-
tion" communicated to "Medicine Ball Cabinet" member Har-
lan F. Stone, the Philadelphian had been the focus of previous
strenuous White House recruitment efforts.7 8 Both before and
after the death of Justice Edward T. Sanford, but before Par-
ker's nomination to fill the vacated seat, Roberts had figured as
Supreme Court timber.7 9 With Parker's fall, Robert's star rose
once more.
CREDENTIALS: ECONOMIC REACTIONARY
Roberts must have impressed Hoover as the ideal post-Parker
Supreme Court nominee. First and foremost Roberts possessed
unassailable credentials as an economic reactionary. Robert's life
story was the virtual antithesis of Parker's as well as that of
most western Republican insurgents who had waylaid Hoover's
legislative program in the Senate and had led the initial assault
on Parker.80 Son of an affluent hardware merchant, Roberts
emerged, in the words of the Literary Digest, "from the bosom
of a well-to-do, middle class family" to become a "jolly and
72 CONG. REc. 8, 8658 (1930) (Roberts was nominated on May 9, 1930).
71 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, December 21, 1926, re-
printed in 5 LETTERs OF Louis D. BRANDEIs: ELDER STATESMAN (1921-1941) 255 (M.
Urofsky and D. Levy, eds. 1978); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone,
April 29, 1929, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, box 49, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.; Carmen, The President, Politics and the Power of Ap-
pointment: Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L. REv. 622 (May
1969) (Roberts as potential chairman of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement).
" Associate Justice Edward T. Sanford died on March 8, 1930, 281 U.S. iii, n.3
(1930); Memorandum by Herbert Hoover, Hughes Views, no date, Presidential Subject
File, Judiciary, U.S. Supreme Court, Appointment of Cardozo, Hoover Papers, supra
note 50, box 193; see World (New York, N.Y.), March 10, 1930, at 2, col. 1; that
Hoover "knew" Roberts was attested to by Justice Van Devanter, Letter from Willis
D. Van Devanter to Frank B. Kellogg, March 17, 1930, Willis D. Van Devanter Papers,
Letterbook 42, box 14, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
10 See Fish, supra note 13; H. SAVAGE, POLrTCAL INDEPENDENTS OF THE HOOVER
ERA: Tim PROGRESSWE INSURGENTS OF THE SENATE 9-35 (dissertation microcopy, 61-
4374, Department of History, University of Illinois, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University
Microfilms, Inc., 1961).
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fun-loving" country "Squire" who attended to his scientifically
managed 800-acre rural estate outside Philadelphia replete with
"blooded beeves, his hogs of irreproachable ancestry, and thro-
rough-bred [sic] colts.""1 It was a posh lifestyle made possible
by development of a lucrative law practice.
The President had before him a typed biography of Roberts.
It stressed the candidate's identification "with much important
litigation in Philadelphia," the very type of association with
capitalistic interests that had evoked heated opposition from
among Senate progressives to the then recent chief justiceship
nomination of Charles Evans Hughes.8 2 The report noted that
Roberts had
successfully represented large sugar concerns in several litigated
cases; represented the underlying companies in a suit brought
by the Phila. Rapid Transit Co. to annul the underlying leases,
from which these companies were collecting about $10,000,000
annually from the operating co.; one of the attorneys in North
Penn Bank failure; counsel for Corn Exchange Nat. Bank in
a test suit which established the rights of National banks in
Pennsylvania to act as administrators, executors, and guardians
and to fill other functions of trust companies. 3
Presumably, Hoover also knew what the press soon made public
knowledge: that the Philadelphian had served as counsel in the
successful suit by the John Wanamaker estate to compel the
United States Treasury to refund the merchant prince's heirs
$100,000 in tax payments, and that he sat on the Board of
Directors of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States as well as on that of a great public utility, the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company and its subsidiary, the Bell
11 An Oil-Fight Champion for the Supreme Court, 105 LrIERARY DIGEST 13 (May
24, 1930); see also A. MASON, Owen Josepheus Roberts, DiOTioNAnY OF AmmEuCAN
BIOGRAPHY, SUPPLEMENT FIvE: 1951-1955, 571-77 (passim) (1977). The title of "Squire"
became the Justice's telephone code reference for his Supreme Court brethren, see N.Y.
Times, October 23, 1977, at 34, col. 6.
82 Hon. Owen J. Roberts, no date, Presidential Subject File, Judiciary, Supreme
Court of U.S., "Biographies of Men Considered," Hoover Papers, supra note 50, box
198. Charles Evans Hughes was nominated on February 3, 1930, 72 CONG. RiEc. 3, 2949
(1930); confirmed on February 13, 1930, id., pt. 4, at 3591. The fight on Hughes is
summarized in J. HAHR=s, supra note 70, at 124-27.
83 Hon. Owen J. Roberts, supra note 82.
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Telephone Company of Pennsylvania.8 4
Roberts' economic ideology had publicly surfaced in 1923
when he addressed an American Banker's Association gathering
at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. Press reminders
of this speech occurred immediately after the Senate received
the nomination. 5 Roberts, in his remarks, had warmly embraced
the tenets of economic conservatism, vehemently warning against
the evils of state socialism that would bring in its train "the
suppression of ambition ... the deterrence of industry ... the
holding back of men who want to arrange their affairs for their
good and the economic good, then for the good of us all." ' 86
His well-heeled listeners were goaded by a call to "take off your
coats, and root for old-fashioned Anglo-Saxon individualism."87
Even in that era of "normalcy," the national government threat-
ened to absorb "too much control over everything" and to
subject every toiling entrepreneur to "a minion of Government
looking over his shoulder with an upraised arm and a threatened
scowl.' '88 Such antipathy to the incipient regulatory state put
him in the camp of economic "laissez-faire" advocates to which
neither the President nor Parker belonged.8 9
Hoover reportedly knew of his second choice's primitive
economic attitudes and knew perfectly well that to name Roberts
would be to make "another appointment which will be regarded
as conservative rather than progressive.' '9 In fact, the situation
called for such a spite nomination. To name a "liberal" candi-
date was simply not politically feasible, Hoover told his Senate
ally Henry Allen. 91 Hoover obliquely stated that "circumstances
4 Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Mo.), May 9, 1930, at 1; Herald Tribune (New York,
N.Y.), May 10, 1930, at 6.
85 Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 10, 1930, at 1, col. 1.
Reprinted in 65 CONG. REc. 3, 2563 (1924).
'Id.
U Id.
" Parker's economic views are considered in Fish, supra note 14; on Hoover's,
see Rornasco, Herbert Hoover's Policies for Dealing with the Great Depression: The
End of the Old Order or the Beginning of the New? in HERBERT HOOVER REASSESSED:
EssAYs COMMEMORATiNG THE FIFmTH ANNVERSARY OF THE INAUGURATION OF OUR
TmRTY-FIRST PRESIDENT 292-309 (1981).
,0 Letter from Henry J. Allen to William Allen White, May 12, 1930, William
Allen White Papers, box C-163, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
" Id.; PUB. PAPERS: HERBERT HOOVER, 1930, 736 (noting Hoover's May 8 meeting
with Senator Allen) (1976).
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seemed to make [a liberal's] appointment at this moment un-
wise." 92 Republican old guardsman and Senate majority leader
James E. Watson had already made the same point to the
President, and made it emphatically. The Parker battle, Watson
reportedly lectured Hoover, had created a White House political
debt to the Republicans who had stood loyally by the President
in that fight, and "it would be rank ingratitude to them to select
a substitute appointee of liberal or progressive or anti-conser-
vative tendencies." 9 Nor could Hoover bring himself to make
an appointment that might justify the anti-Parker opposition of
Republican deserters, especially the progressive insurgents. Such
would likely be interpreted as capitulation to that obstreperous
opposition bloc whose members reportedly favored Judge Wil-
liam S. Kenyon of the Eighth Circuit. 94
It was a satisfied majority leader who left the White House
on an early May morning, confident in the knowledge that the
President "would name no man whom the progressives-the
unfaithful Republicans, could cheer. ' 95 Henry Allen came away
with the same conviction, albeit a disheartening one for him,
but confident that after Roberts, the President "has in mind a
liberal who will succeed to the next vacancy."196 Perhaps under
different political circumstances, Hoover's desire for regional
representation in a Supreme Court appointment would be real-
ized in the naming of a Westerner, an ardent "dry," and an
economic progressive like ex-Senator Kenyon. 97 Meanwhile,
Hoover eyed responses to his nomination of Roberts. Should
the nominee's economic philosophy fail to generate opposition
from among those who had opposed Parker, other repulsive
credentials existed.
92 White Papers, supra note 90.
9' Thurston, Politics from the Sidelines, World (New York, N.Y.), May 18, 1930,
at 2E.
Judge Kenyon, Please, 5 Ti PEOPLE'S BusNmmss 1 (March, 1930); World (New
York, N.Y.), May 9, 1930, at 4, col. 1; LaFollette's Comment, The Progressive (Ma-
dison, Wisc.), March 22, 1930, at 1.
9S Thurston, supra note 93.
9 White Papers, supra note 90.
Kenyon's congressional accomplishments as a leader of the "farm bloc" are
summarized in 24 NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 60-61 (1935).
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CREDENTIALS: "RED" HUNTER
Unlikely to endear Roberts to old anti-war progressives was
his decidedly bleak wartime record on civil liberties, a subject
of passing press attention in 1930.98 Roberts had served during
1918 as Special Deputy Attorney General of the United States, 99
in which capacity he had successfully prosecuted several impor-
tant Espionage Act cases against alien radicals deemed to be
threats to internal security. One target was the Lithuanian So-
cialist Federation and Kova, its press organ, which echoed the
world-wide outcry of socialists against the Great War. National
Secretary Joseph Stilson mimeographed anti-war leaflets subse-
quently distributed outside Holy Trinity Lithuanian Church in
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.'°0 One Baltic language tract warned:
The whole present world war is nothing more than the cruel
play of the capitalists of the warring countries and other ex-
ploiters for the purpose of gaining wealth from the lives of
the people of their own countries .... War brings death to
the workingman and profits to the capitalists .... Down with
the war and compulsory conscription! Long live peace and the
will of the people!101
In a fifty-minute oration to the jury, prosecutor Roberts
assailed the "red" journalists for belittling patriotism and mili-
tary service and for seeking to arouse political, as distinguished
from traditional religious, objections to military obligations.102
Overt acts of publication constituted a wartime conspiracy to
cause insubordination, obstruction of enlistment efforts, and
inciting draftees to desert whether or not success capped the
Herald Tribune (New York, N.Y.), May 10, 1930, at 6.
Letter from Thomas W. Gregory to Owen J. Roberts, May 2, 1918, Owen J.
Roberts Personnel Folder, R-163, National Personnel Record Center, St. Louis, Mo.;
Letter from Roberts to Gregory, May 7, 1918, id. (reporting that he commenced his
duties on May 6, 1918); Letter from Samuel J. Graham to Owen J. Roberts, July 1,
1918, id. (extending a temporary appointment which expired on June 30, 1918 to one
"for the duration of the present war, or until further notice"); Letter from Carroll
Todd to Owen J. Roberts, February 3, 1919, id. (accepting resignation of Roberts
effective December 31, 1918).
,00 Transcript of Record, Stilson v. United States (no. 795) and Sukays v. United
States (no. 796) (E.D. Pa.) at 13, 157-158, United States Supreme Court Appellate Case
Files, File 26881-82, U.S. Supreme Court Records, Record Group 267, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
101 Id. at 10-11 (English translation).
I0 d. at 349.
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propaganda effort.103 Waving aside defenses based on the first
and fourth amendments, the federal trial judge gave Roberts
and his cohorts a smashing courtroom victory. 14 Further vindi-
cation of Roberts' performance came late in 1919, when the
Supreme Court upheld Stilson's conviction in the wake of the
then recently decided Schenck, 1" Frohwerk,'1 and Debs'07 cases.
10 8
Affirmed the next year was Roberts' handiwork in Schaefer
v. United States.0 9 Prosecution of Peter S. Schaefer, President
of the Philadelphia Tageblatt Association and editor of a Ger-
man language newspaper, had gone awry when the Justice De-
partment invoked the treason statute and then the Espionage
Act against the defendants." 0 Into the fray stepped Special As-
sistant United States Attorney Owen Roberts. His legal acumen
enabled the government to defeat the defendant's efforts to
arrest the trial court's judgment and receive a new trial."' Tri-
umph for Roberts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was
followed by Supreme Court endorsement of broad restrictions
on wartime freedom of speech and rejection of the then recently
coined "clear and present danger" principle proffered by dis-
senters Brandeis and Holmes." 2
CREDENTIALS: INTERNATIONALIST AND ANTI-PROHIBITIONIST
In the post-war era, Roberts had become an eastern inter-
nationalist who favored American adherence to the World
-03 United States v. Stilson, 254 F. 120, 122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
14 Transcript of Record, supra note 100, at 414.
lo, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
06 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
,07 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
101 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
09 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
110 United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1918). The district judge charged
that,
[e]ven mere words may be fraught with consequences which, although too
remote to constitute the crime of treason, may nevertheless be words which
are fraught with the most awful consequences ... and, therefore, it is
properly within the province of the law to prohibit ... and make it a
crime even to utter them.
Schaefer, 251 U.S. 493 n.1 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat.
217, as amended by Act of May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 553; 1918 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
42.
M United States v. Schaefer, 254 F. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
112 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-83.
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Court. "13 This international element in his background could only
have agitated Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Wil-
liam Borah, the loud opponent of such foreign entanglements
as the League of Nations and its judicial satellite. 14 It had been
Borah who spearheaded the anti-Parker forces in the Senate."15
Leading anti-Parker progressives, including Borah, and their
southern Democratic allies were prohibitionists, or "drys." Re-
placement nominee Roberts had spoken out, however, against
national prohibition. He had assailed the eighteenth amendment
for reducing the American Constitution to the status of a lowly
city ordinance." '6 As would soon become public knowledge, it
turned out that his law partner was not only a militant "wet,"
but also served as a director of the Association Against the
Prohibition Amendment. ' 7 Hoover reportedly knew, prior to
making the nomination, about Roberts' anti-prohibition views,
which were sure to unsettle senatorial "drys" who had deserted
him on the temperate Parker."" News about Roberts' anti-pro-
hibition attitude and associations thoroughly discomforted such
senatorial pro-labor "drys" as anti-Parker eighteenth amend-
ment author Morris Sheppard of Texas and pro-Parker Wesley
Jones of Washington State, sponsor of the "Five and Ten"
Act. 19 Decisive in soothing their agitation were assurances given
by pillars of both the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohi-
bition, and Public Morals and the Anti-Saloon League.' 20
CREDENTIALS: F1,mND OF BLACKS
If Hoover's second choice represented an apparent appease-
ment of the anti-Parker constituency, the appeasement resulted
from Robert's reputed racial attitudes. No evidence exists that
Hoover possessed any information on those attitudes nor, if he
did, that the nomination pivoted on them, although the NAACP
"' See Herald Tribune (New York), May 10, 1930, at 6, col. 2.
"' See L. Astay, Tim SPEARLESS LEADER: SENATOR BORAH AND THE PRoGREssrvE
MovrNr IN THE 1920's 202 (1972).
' Watson, The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics,
50 THE Miss. VALLEY HisT. Ray. 213, 226 (September 1963).
M6 See supra note 86.
" Herald Tribune (New York), May 10, 1930, at 1, col. 1.
I' Id. May 11, 1930, at 14.
119 Id. May 13, 1930, at 10, col. 5.
110 Letter from Morris L, Cooke to George W. Norris, May 10, 1930, Harry A.
Slattery Papers, box 20, Manuscripts Department, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
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Publicity Director would later claim that Roberts had been nom-
inated "largely to satisfy the demands of Negroes for a man of
his character and views. '1 21
Acting NAACP Secretary Walter Francis White, who had
organized and directed the Association's notable fight against
Parker, received early word from a Philadelphia contact that
"OWEN J. ROBERTS IS ALL RIGHT. ' 122 A similar assess-
ment came from Jewish leader Jacob Billikopf, who felt "quite
certain" that the new nominee was "very liberal" on the subject
of race, albeit not "so on economic matters.' ' 2 Decisive was
Roberts' relationship with black Lincoln University that was
located forty-five miles southwest of Philadelphia. To it, Roberts
had reportedly donated $250.00, had given the 1929 commence-
ment address, and had become a trustee that same year.' 24
Apparently impeccable race credentials doubtlessly elated
White and members of the NAACP's Board of Directors who
met on May 12th. They were as predisposed in favor of Roberts
as they had formerly been against Parker. All agreed that Rob-
erts was, as Board Chairman Mary White Ovington would sub-
sequently write, "a liberal on the race question."'' 25 Even if the
nominee had been less attractive, Board officials would have
hesitated to oppose him. After all, they realized that in the wake
of their campaign to defeat Hoover's first choice, "it would be
psychologically advantageous for the Association to demonstrate
that it is not a pure 'anti' organization.' '1 26
QUIESCENT "LIBERALS"
With the exception of its race aspects, which received little
publicity, the Roberts nomination had all the trappings of a spite
nomination. A fight was initially "assumed in every quarter.
121 P. BAKER, NEGRo-WmrE ADUSTMENT: AN INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF
METHODS IN THE INTERRACIAL MOVEMENT IN Tim UNITrD STATES 86 (1934).
'1 Letter from Isadore Martin to Walter White, May 10, 1930 (telegram), box C-
391, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers [hereinafter
NAACP Papers], Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; see also
B. Ross, J.E. SPiNOARN AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP, 1911-1939 (1972).
"1 Letter from Jacob Billikopf to Walter White, May 12, 1930, NAACP Papers,
supra note 122.
"2 Letter from Henry C. Patterson to Walter White, May 12, 1930, id.
125 M. OViNGOTON, Tim WAiLs CAm TumBLING DOwN 257 (1947).
"1 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors," May 12, 1930, at 2, Board
of Directors Minutes 1930-1943, NAACP Papers, supra note 122, microfilm roll 2.
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Day after day," Washington-based investigative reporter Paul
Y. Anderson of the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch recalled,
through publicity avenues usually recognized as reflecting White
House views, it was dinned into the Senate's ears that Roberts
was a corporation lawyer, that his economic and social views
were ultra-conservative, that he belonged to the Mellon school
of thought, that he was infinitely more reactionary than either
Hughes or Parker, and that failure of Senate liberals to oppose
his confirmation would constitute an abandonment of their
principles. 127
Roberts' publicly known economic associations and attitudes
seemed sure ingredients for inciting hostility from Senate pro-
gressives and organized labor. But five days after submission of
the nomination, an unenthusiastic A.F. of L. President William
Green announced that the Federation would "not interpose any
objection to... confirmation."' 1 He vaguely reasoned that the
nominee's "experience and training, have been in a field where
he has had wide opportunity to understand the problems which
grow out of human relations in industry and those profound
economic and social problems which so vitally affect human
relationships.' 129 Others harbored doubts. Socialist party leader
Norman Thomas suspected one who was "by reputation a con-
servative and a leader of the bar in an ultra-conservative city."' 30
He wanted the Senate Judiciary Committee to "find a way to
frame questions which would bring out the [nominee's] ...
opinions ... on cases involving rates ... and ... valuation of
public utilities, and in general, the right of the Court to overrule
Congress and the public in the field of social legislation. 131 But
Committee progressives and anti-Parker leaders George Norris
and William Borah deemed such requests "sarcastic" and turned
a deaf ear to them. 32
'"Anderson, Plots and Counterplots, 130 Tm NAnON 651 (June 4, 1930).
2 William Green, Press Release for Wednesday morning, May 14, 1930, Circular
Neostyle File, 1906-1937, American Federation of Labor Records: The Samuel Gompers
Era, Part 1 (Records held by the AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.), microfilm roll 57
(Microfilming Corporation of America, 1979).
'19 Id.; see Greensboro Daily News, May 14, 1930, at 1.
110 Letter from Norman Thomas to George W. Norris, reprinted in Post-Dispatch
(St. Louis), May 18, 1930, at 5A, col. 4.
131 Id.
" Greensboro Daily News, May 20, 1930, at 1, 3.
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The "liberal" press, fresh from its deep and successful in-
volvement in the Senate fight on Parker,"' grappled heroically
with the known economic views and associations of Hoover's
substitute Supreme Court nominee. Editor Walter Lippmann in
The World smothered his initial doubts expressed on the very
day of Robert's nomination, and asked Felix Frankfurter: "What
do you know about Owen Roberts?"'13 4 His editorial in the next
morning's World echoed Frankfurter in hailing Roberts as "a
thoroughly creditable choice" and one that would fully satisfy
all "who feel that it is of the highest importance to preserve the
balance between those who take a liberal and those who take a
conservative view of the Constitution.'"'5 Hoover's second choice
generated greater consternation at Scripps-Howard newspapers.
Bothersome to chief editorial writer Ludwell Denny was "[h]ow
far his associations as corporation attorney have colored his
thinking on economic questions involving human rights."' 6 This
point had special saliency because of the editorial writer's earlier
anti-Parker editorial on "Widow Cook, Abe Span-And The
Supreme Court.' '137 An alert reader of the Washington Daily
News subsequently flagged the paradox. "The News must know,"
he protested, "that Owen Roberts was the eager advocate whom
the big insurance corporation chose to take its [wrongful death]
case to the Supreme Court after Span had defeated it in all the
lower courts.' 1 38 All true, admitted the mortified Washington
Daily News, which expressed relief that the nominee "wasn't
something worse" and irrelevantly confessed to liking "his at-
"' George H. Manning, Press Opposition Was Determining Factor in Parker De-
feat, 62 EDrTOR AND PuBLISHm 28 (May 17, 1930).
134 Letter from Walter Lippmann to Felix Frankfurter, May 9, 1930, Walter Lippmann
Papers, Series 1, box 10a, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn.; see Letter from Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, May 22, 1930, Harlan F. Stone
Papers, box 13, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
"I Lippmann, The Appointment of Owen J, Roberts, World, May 10, 1930, p. 12 .
Authorship identified in Anthony Collection, microfilm roll 8 (World editorials from
January 29, 1930 through February 27, 1931), Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts
and Archives, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
116 Denny, The Supreme Court Nominee, Daily News (Washington, D.C.), May 10,
1930, at 12. Authorship identified in Ludwell Denny Papers, microfilm roll 1 (Micro
612), Division of Archives and Manuscripts, State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
Madison, Wisc.
'17 Denny, Widow Cook, Abe Span-And the Supreme Court, unidentified newspa-
per clipping, but authorship identified in Denny Papers, supra note 136.
"I Letter from Gerald W. Brooks to Editor, Daily News (Washington, D.C.), May
12, 1930, at 13.
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titude toward the Eighteenth Amendment."13 9
The Baltimore Sun's pro-Parker columnist Frank R. Kent
delighted in the dilemma confronting those who had opposed
Hoover's first choice. He sarcastically asked "why no piercing
screams of protest have come from our pure-hearted Senatorial
Progressives over the prospect of Mr. Owen J. Roberts going
upon the Supreme Bench."' 4 Had they not assailed Hughes
"because of his 'attitude of mind,' his 'corporate connections,'
the 'character of his legal practice,' and his 'mental slant'?
Their opposition to Parker had likewise rested on "principle.' ' 41
Those whom Kent dubbed "disinterested champions of the com-
mon people, defenders of 'human rights' as against 'property
rights' had promised "that this battle would go on unceasingly,
it being in the nature of a high duty and a sacred trust.' ' 42 Their
silent acquiescence when confronted by Roberts' nomination led
Kent to question whether "the Progressives are in front of or
in the rear of their principles ... [and whether] they have 'sold
US out.""' 1
43
Roberts' appointment enabled administration spokesmen "to
hurl shafts of ridicule at the Republican independents for gag-
ging at Hughes and Parker and accepting Roberts."' 144 Hoover
knew that however out of phase Roberts' ideological proclivities
were with those of the Senate progressives, his nominee enjoyed
an acknowledged professional reputation of national dimen-
sions.4 5 Uniquely, he possessed great visibility arising out of his
service as special prosecutor in the "Teapot Dome" scandals.
The latter had given Roberts the aura of a reformer and created
a symbiotic bond with progressive Senators and allied press
sleuths who had pursued Warren Harding's cronies.Y6 Had Rob-
erts not for six years waged "the people's fight in the oil cases?"
Denny asked. 4 7 So impressed was Paul Anderson of the Pulitz-
"' Letter from Editor to Gerald W. Brooks, Daily News (Washington, D.C.), May
12, 1930, at 13.
140 The Great Game of Politics, Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 15, 1930, at 1.
1' Id.
142 Id.
1'3 Id.
'"Thurston, supra note 93; Anderson, supra note 127.
"' Hon. Owen J. Roberts, supra note 82.
,"A.F.C., Backstage in Washington, 155 OUTLOOK AND INDEPENDENT 100 (May
21, 1930).
"' Letter, supra note 139.
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er's Post-Dispatch with that prosecutorial performance that he
hailed Roberts' "btilliarit and indefatigable record" which had
given him "a singularly high standing with the Senate, where
the oil investigation originated."' 4 8 Nothing could undo Roberts'
prior service to the reformers' cause. A press-instigated form of
"doublespeak" developed to defend the former Teapot Dome
special prosecutor. Roberts, it seemed, was "distinctly liberal in
thought," although he had admittedly compiled an "imposing
record of economic conservatism."' 149 Perhaps he was "not a
liberal in the constructive sense in which Holmes and Brandeis
are liberals," Anderson mused, but he was surely "at least an
intelligent conservative, thoroughly honest and utterly independ-
ent ... [whose] judgments will never be mere echoes of the
devious sophistries of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes."' 150 Thus did
Washington reporters rally to their hero's side, silence their
doubts, and bestir "themselves for one whom they [had] come
to regard almost as a colleague."''
HOOVER TRIUMPHANT
Special satisfaction must have come over the President when,
ten days after submission of the nomination, Senator Borah
reported it favorably from the Judiciary Committee.5 A day
later, Democratic leader Joseph Robinson of Arkansas stated on
the Senate floor his understanding that a unanimous Committee
had reported the nomination favorably. When Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman Norris confirmed this fact, Robinson an-
nounced his assent to immediate consideration. In less than a
minute and with no more than twenty senators present, Vice-
President Curtis intoned "without objection the nomination is
confirmed," blissfully unaware that he had never called the
question. 3 Such summary action by often irascible senators
caused prescient syndicated humorist Will Rogers to speculate
that "there must be something the matter with this fellow Judge
Roberts of the Supreme Court." That the Senate "passed him
141 Post-Dispatch (St. Louis), May 9, 1930, at 1, col. 8.
149 Id. at 1-2.
110 Anderson, The Supreme Court Victory, 130 THE NATION 599 (May 21, 1930).
" A.F.C., supra note 146.
2 72 CONG. REc. 9, 9115 (1930).
Sun (Baltimore, Md.), May 21, 1930, at 2. Roberts was confirmed on May 20,
1930, reported in 72 CONG. Rnc. 9, 9217 (1930).
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unanimously" only suggested to the Oklahoman that "he must
be queer, can't be human."' 54
As would soon become apparent, the essence of Mr. Justice
Roberts' prospective judicial philosophy was very much in the
eyes of the beholder in 1930. The jurist's performance thereafter
became all "gall and wormwood" to Parker's antagonists. 55 In
the short run, however, it seemed that Hoover had temporized
in his second nomination. During the Supreme Court's three
terms beginning in October 1930, Chief Justice Hughes presided
over a generally united Court which cast a sympathetic eye on
economic regulation by governments, chiefly those of the several
states. Rarely did Roberts dissent; when he did, it was usually
to uphold government activity. ' -1 Roberts' performance seemed
especially noteworthy in the 1930 term, his first. A careful Court-
watcher tallied the votes cast that term in nonunanimous deci-
sions by the nine Justices. Both Roberts and Hughes came down
on the "liberal" side an even dozen times as compared to
Brandeis in sixteen cases, Stone in fifteen, and the iconoclastic
McReynolds in only one. 57 Consequently, the jurisprudential
tide seemed to have shifted.
Evidence that the two Hoover appointees might prove un-
reliable allies of Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis surfaced even in
the 1930 term, and again the following term, when the Court
majority including Roberts overturned Interstate Commerce
Commission rulings with alacrity. 5 8 Thereafter Roberts' true
economic colors became increasingly obvious. In Supreme Court
terms from 1931 through 1935, the former favorite of the Senate
progressives found himself far more often in agreement with the
Chief Justice and Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler,
and McReynolds in nonunanimous decisions than he ever did
'-4 Rogers, Will Rogers Finds It a Good Law that Forbids Asking for a Ride, 2
WILL ROGERS' DAILY TELEORAMs, THE HOOVER YEARS: 1929-1931, 170 (J. Smallwood
and S. Grager, eds. 1978).
D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, THE NmINE OLD MEN 140 (1937).
,5 See C. LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1937 28-35 (1971).
I" G. HANKIN & C. HANKIN, PROGRESS OF THE LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
1930-1931, A REVIEW OF THE WORK OF ma SUPREME COURT OF Ta UNITED STATES FOR
OCTOBER TERM, 1930, 16 (1931).
M, See A. MASON, HARLAN FIsrE STONE: PILLAR OF mar LAW 310-11 (1956). The
I.C.C. cases were: United States v. Chicago, Mil. and St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311
(1931); United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 284 U.S. 195 (1931); Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
R.R. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 (1931).
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with Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. 15 9 This period witnessed the
Court's drift toward narrow construction of state and federal
powers over economic matters. It was a drift to a pre-1930
jurisprudence for which one scholar credits Roberts as "the man
most responsible .. . joined from time to time by Chief Justice
Hughes.' 16 New Deal measures would receive an especially chilly
reception from this Justice who outpaced Hughes in voting
against them.1 61 True to his pre-Court beliefs, Roberts as Asso-
ciate Justice compiled a fifteen-year record marked by striking
anti-labor and anti-economic regulation votes, not to mention
his warm embrace of mechanical jurisprudence as attested by
famous dicta in United States v. Butler.1 62
Confidence in Roberts' fidelity to equal rights received great
impetus in 1932 when he joined four Supreme Court colleagues
behind Justice Benjamin Cardozo's opinion in Nixon v. Con-
don. 6 3 It was the first major voting rights test to come before
the High Court in years and the NAACP could barely restrain
its enthusiasm. "Texas White Primary Victory in [United States
Supreme Court] by Five to Four Vote Demonstrates," it pro-
claimed, "[the] Wisdom [of the] NAACP in Excluding Parker
from Bench. . . ."'6 In 1935, however, Roberts would author a
unanimous opinion in Grovey v. Townsend.165 Grovey upheld
Texas' white primary-now disentangled from all forms of overt
statutory connection and thus free of "state action" subject to
"I Pritchett, Ten Years of Supreme Court Voting, 50 Soc. SciENcE Q. 979 (March
1970).
160 C. LEONARD, supra note 156, at 47.
161 Id. at 78.
-62 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Roberts stated that all legislation must conform to the
principles laid down by the Constitution).
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Gov-
ernment has only one duty, - to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former. All the court does or can do, is to announce
its considered judgment upon the question.
Id. at 62-63. See C. PmuicuTrT, Tan RoosEvELT COURT: A STUDY IN JuDIc AL PoLrnIcs
AND VALUES, 1937-1947, 89 (1969) (Table XV shows Robert's voting record on state
taxation and regulation and table XXI shows Robert's record with regard to labor).
With regard to Robert's voting record between 1941-45, Pritchett noted that "Roberts
is of course isolated on the far right." Id. at 208.
163 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
D. HnE, BLACK VIcTORY: THE RisE AND FALL OF THE WarE PRIMARY IN TEXAs
141 n.56 (1979) (quoting the press release to major black newspapers, May 3, 1932).
1- 295 U.S. 45 (1934).
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restraints imposed by the fourteenth amendment. 66 Nine years
later in Smith v. Allwright,6 7 the Court would take an expansive
view of "state action" and subvert Roberts' handiwork in
Grovey.'6 A solo dissent rang out from none other than an
outraged Owen Josepheus Roberts.'6 9
CONCLUSION
When subjected to close examination the Roberts appoint-
ment evinces the hallmarks of a spite nomination. Hoover had
been politically wounded by the Senate's defeat of his first-
choice nominee, John J. Parker of North Carolina. The Presi-
dent reacted; he seethed in private while remaining publicly
silent. Finally, he reacted by making a second nomination like-
wise enveloped in public silence. The foreshadowed essence of
his nominee became apparent over the course of time. But even
with the elapse of nearly sixty years, agreement is not unanimous
on classification of Roberts' appointment as a spite nomination.
Denial of reality is the approach taken by Harvard Law
Professor Laurence Tribe. He regards Roberts as one "less
wedded to the wisdom of the past" than was Parker and as the
judicial savior of the New Deal whose 1937 "switch in time"
salvaged vital social and economic welfare legislation.' 70 Thus is
the prescience of the substitute nominee's anti-Parker supporters
vindicated by scholarly hindsight. In the wake of the Bork and
Ginsburg setbacks, Anthony Lewis in the New York Times com-
pared Hoover's response to Parker's defeat with Reagan's re-
sponse to Bork's rejection by the Senate. Hoover, Lewis praised,
"put the merits above politics" and named Benjamin N. Car-
dozo.' 7 But the year of Cardozo's appointment was 1932, not
1930. Thus, Lewis' comments suggest that the Roberts nomina-
tion had become a forgotten event a half century after it oc-
curred.
,6 Id. at 52-55.
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Id. (overruling Grovey).
169 Id. at 666 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
170 L. TRiE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 90-91 (1985).
17' Lewis, Abroad and at Home: Playing with the Court, N.Y. Times, November
8, 1987, § 4, at 25, col. 1.
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Even in its own time, the Roberts nomination had been
regarded as a truly ironical one. "The fighting liberals of the
United States Senate" had confirmed Roberts "as one of their
number," Drew Pearson and Robert Allen observed in 1937,
the year of Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing bill. But the
Justice, the political commentators mocked, "has turned out to
be the foremost meat-axe of their cause.'1" 72 For the fifteen years
of Roberts' tenure (1930-1945), Parker's antagonists "ate crow."
Hoover had offered them, and they had accepted with alacrity,
the consummate spite nomination.
Hoover had managed to select as his second choice what
successors Nixon and Reagan failed to find, a Supreme Court
candidate whose public image belied deeply held attitudes on the
paramount public issues of the day. An engaging personality,
lawyerly reknown, and a reformer image promoted by journalists
who had directly benefitted from their association with him
combined to make Roberts a viable second choice. Subordinated
were a laundry list of credentials that should have made him
anathema to those who had successfully defeated Hoover's orig-
inal choice: economic conservative, "Red" hunter, internation-
alist, and anti-prohibitionist. Less fortunate in their choices were
Nixon and Reagan. Both acted with overt vindictiveness and
stressed political ideology as a key appointment criterion. Nixon
selected a successor nominee whose credentials practically paro-
died those of first-choice Haynsworth and whose professional
standing fell far short of that of either Haynsworth or Roberts.
Reagan's second choice, Douglas Ginsburg, suggested the dan-
gers confronting presidential decision-making in the context of
bitter defeat: haste, emotion, and inadequate investigation of
the successor nominee's background. Haste also marked Rob-
erts' nomination; however, no confirmation-quashing skeletons
toppled out of his closet, as they did from Ginsburg's and
Carswell's closets. When the barely concealed skeletons of 1930
did fall, they fell not on the appointing President, but on his
opponents in the Senate.
72 D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 155, at 139.
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